Models of data and theoretical hypotheses: a case-study in classical genetics
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 2, S. 293-319
ISSN: 1573-0964
7 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 2, S. 293-319
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Droit et société: revue internationale de théorie du droit et de sociologie juridique, Band 110, Heft 1, S. 87-105
ISSN: 0769-3362
Selon le story-model , théorie psychologique du raisonnement et de la prise de décision des jurés proposée par Nancy Pennington et Reid Hastie dans les années 1980, les jurés d'un procès criminel interprètent et évaluent les preuves qui leur sont présentées au moyen d'une représentation mentale des événements – un récit –, plutôt que par un calcul combinatoire du poids des éléments à charge et à décharge. C'est avant tout la cohérence et la complétude du récit ainsi construit qui déterminent le verdict – et non pas les preuves elles-mêmes, puisque l'importance et la signification de ces dernières dépendent à leur tour de la manière dont elles s'intègrent dans le récit. Quoique déjà assez ancien, le story-model fait encore assez largement autorité aujourd'hui. Il recèle pourtant de nombreuses difficultés, tant conceptuelles qu'empiriques, que cet article met en évidence.
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 198, Heft S15, S. 3609-3633
ISSN: 1573-0964
International audience ; This paper proposes a critical assessment of the concept of "conspiracy theory" as a coherent object of investigation, and evaluates the prospects for an integration of various avenues of research-sociological, epistemological, psychological-that deal with it. Because of the threat posed by conspiracy theories to public health and political stability, academic efforts to understand the sociological and cognitive basis for the adoption of such views, as well as their epistemological flaws, are undoubtedly needed. But the preliminary question of the unity, and of the specificity of the class of things called "conspiracy theories", is often overlooked. It is addressed in this paper. Starting from a tentative classification of the various ideations labelled "conspiracy theories", we then focus on a particularly important subclass thereof, namely those promoting anti-scientific views. From this, we draw a first, sceptical conclusion as to the existence of a clear-cut boundary between conspiracy thinking and healthy rational critique of science (both sociological and philosophical). This leads us to evaluate the attempt of analysing conspiracy theories' epistemic flaws in the light of philosophical standards for scientific theories. Having shown that this route is a dead-end, we highlight what appears as a major divide among philosophical and psychological accounts of CTs, namely whether one should treat them as irrational, or as merely wrong (in the latter, rationalist approach, CTs would just be wrong statements resulting from rational operations). Focusing again on anti-science CTs, we finally argue in favour of a politically and socially contextualised approach to the growth and spread of conspiracy ideations, over a scheme considering CTs as abstract entities, independently from the socially situated agents who hold them.
BASE
International audience ; This paper proposes a critical assessment of the concept of "conspiracy theory" as a coherent object of investigation, and evaluates the prospects for an integration of various avenues of research-sociological, epistemological, psychological-that deal with it. Because of the threat posed by conspiracy theories to public health and political stability, academic efforts to understand the sociological and cognitive basis for the adoption of such views, as well as their epistemological flaws, are undoubtedly needed. But the preliminary question of the unity, and of the specificity of the class of things called "conspiracy theories", is often overlooked. It is addressed in this paper. Starting from a tentative classification of the various ideations labelled "conspiracy theories", we then focus on a particularly important subclass thereof, namely those promoting anti-scientific views. From this, we draw a first, sceptical conclusion as to the existence of a clear-cut boundary between conspiracy thinking and healthy rational critique of science (both sociological and philosophical). This leads us to evaluate the attempt of analysing conspiracy theories' epistemic flaws in the light of philosophical standards for scientific theories. Having shown that this route is a dead-end, we highlight what appears as a major divide among philosophical and psychological accounts of CTs, namely whether one should treat them as irrational, or as merely wrong (in the latter, rationalist approach, CTs would just be wrong statements resulting from rational operations). Focusing again on anti-science CTs, we finally argue in favour of a politically and socially contextualised approach to the growth and spread of conspiracy ideations, over a scheme considering CTs as abstract entities, independently from the socially situated agents who hold them.
BASE
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 191, Heft 15, S. 3595-3620
ISSN: 1573-0964
In: Synthese: an international journal for epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science, Band 190, Heft 2, S. 187-188
ISSN: 1573-0964